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ABSTRACT
This paper tests restrictions implied by the canonical theory of insurance under asymmetric
information using ideal data that contains the self-perceived and actual mortality risk of individuals,
as well as the price and quantity of their life insurance.
We report several findings which are hard to reconcile with the canonical theory. First, we
find a striking independence of self-perceived risk and the price of insurance. Second, we find
strong evidence of the opposite type of non-linear pricing than predicted by theory: the theory
predicts that prices rise with quantity, but we find that they fall. Third, we find that risk is negatively
correlated with the quantity of insurance purchased although the theory predicts a positive
correlation. Fourth, we find that a substantial fraction of individuals hold multiple insurance
contracts, which casts doubt on the prediction that unit prices rise with quantity because multiple
small contracts dominate a large one in such a case. Lastly, we test the accuracy of the self-perceived
risk of the insured through estimating the induced profits they imply. We conclude by discussing
the robustness of these results and the questions they raise for future theoretical models.
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and NBER1 Introduction
Economists have long studied the market distortions that result from the
asymmetry of information between well-informed demanders and poorly-
informed suppliers of insurance, Government regulation and sponsorship
of insurance is often justified with the claim that such asymmetric informa-
tion results in adverse selection and underprovision of insurance. Indeed,
this claim is taken as obvious by economists and is often used to rationalize
almost a third of the U.S. federal budget through social insurance, such as So-
cial Security and Medicare, and to explain the scarcity of markets in certain
types of insurance (e.g., that for long term care or disability ).2 Despite this
well-known case for government intervention, there exists little systematic
and quantitative evidence on the degree to which asymmetric information
limits or affects trade in insurance. This paper evaluates the validity of these
claims in the U.S. life insurance market, which, in spite of these claims, is a
privately operated market and one of the most commonly held and largest
forms of insurance in the U.S. and other countries. For example, in 1992
78% of U.S. households reported owning life insurance, for a total of $11,105
billion in awards. Indeed, life insurance is the most widely-held financial
product in the U. S., including bank savings accounts.3 The life insurance
market is particularly useful to analyze because the private information cru-
cial in that market–with regard to health and mortality–is also crucial to
government-sponsored health insurance and annuities, which make up the
bulk of government insurance in many countries.
This paper tests the implication of canonical theory that private insurance
markets characterized by asymmetric information provide inefficient levels of
coverage. An important feature of this study is that we use direct evidence
on the self-perceived and actual mortality risk of demanders of life insurance
as well as the prices and quantities of their insurance. These data allow us
to test not only the restrictions on price and quantity of traded insurance
but also the restrictions on price, quantity, and the risk of the insured. Our
main conclusion is that using these ideal data, several of our findings seem
irreconcilable with canonical theory.
The paper may be outlined as follows. Section 2 outlines the restric-
2For example, see Stiglitz (1988) pp. 332-333 and Akerlof (1970) pp. 12-14.
3American Council of Life Insurance, Life Insurance Fact Book (p. 6.) and SMR
Research Corporation, (1995), The New American Lije Insurance Consumer.
3tions of competitive equilibrium insurance under, alternatively, symmetric
and asymmetric information. We focus on the predictions of Rothschild and
Stiglitz (1976), the most common model referred to for the trade reductions
induced by private insurance under asymmetric information. The first re-
striction we discuss concerns the correlation of insurance demand with unit
price across the risk of the insured. Under symmetric information, control-
ling for the loss to be insured, the amount of insurance purchased is predicted
to be invariant with the price charged across consumers of different risk; the
higher willingness to pay for insurance of riskier individuals is offset by the
higher price they face. On the other hand, under asymmetric information,
quantities are predicted to be positively correlated with unit prices, the op-
posite of bulk discounts, because insurers are predicted to design contracts
so that the high risk can purchase large quantities of insurance, but at a
high unit price. The low risk, on the other hand, are quantity-constrained,
in order to make their contract undesirable to the high risk, but are charged
a lower unit price commensurate with their lower risk. Since the high risk
face quantities at higher prices, the two covary positively, as opposed to not
covarying under symmetric information.
The second restriction concerns how much insurance is purchased by peo-
ple of different risk. Controlling for the loss to be insured, symmetric infor-
mation implies no difference in quantity across risk, whereas asymmetric
information implies that the risky buy larger contracts. This implication
follows from the low risks imposed on the quantity constraints. The theory
predicts that good risks get poorly treated, which seems at odds with actual
markets in which bad risks are avoided by insurers.
The third restriction we test concerns the joint distribution of prices and
risk (whether such risk is self-perceived or actual). In competitive markets,
both symmetric and asymmetric information imply that prices perfectly re-
flect the risk of the insured. Under symmetric information this simply follows
from risk being priced out, but under asymmetric information, it is the re-
sult of risk groups self-selecting into contracts which perfectly reveal their
risk type, permitting the insurer to price out risk.
The fourth restriction is an implicit prohibition on the insured owning
multiple insurance contracts. The theory predicts that unit prices rise with
quantity because the risky are willing to pay a high unit price commensurate
with their higher risk because in exchange they can buy larger contracts.
However, when the risky can buy several of the smaller, cheap, contracts
4designed for the low risk, they would pay less than if they bought a bigger,
more expensive contract with one insurer. For example, if a million-dollar
contract costs 5 cents on the dollar, and a half-million-dollar contract costs
1 cent on the dollar, then buying two of the half-million-dollar contracts
is cheaper than buying the one-million-dollar contract. An insurer can not
identify the risk of the insured by the size of the contract with their firm only.
If consumers can buy more than one insurance contract, therefore, it casts
considerable doubt on the prediction that unit price rises with quantity.
The fifth and final restriction we test concerns the profits of insurers.
Naturally, any theory predicts that these must be positive given actual risk.
However, the theory of asymmetric information predicts that profits esti-
mated using the self-perceived risk of the insured should also be positive.
Section 3 tests these restrictions using data from three sources: (1) a ran-
dom sample of policies collected by LIMRA International, which is a consor-
tium of life insurance providers, (2) the Health and Retirement Study (HRS),
and (3) The Asset and Health Dynamics Among The Oldest Old (AHEAD).
The last two data sources allow us to directly assess how risk, whether self-
perceived risk by demanders or actual mortality risk, is distributed across
traded contracts because HRS and AHEAD report the mortality beliefs of
respondents and the actual mortality of respondents between waves. These
data thus allow us to test directly the discussed restrictions imposed on the
relationship between quantity, price, and risk (both self-perceived and ac-
tual).
To illustrate part of our findings, consider Figure 1 which depicts the
prices of life insurance for the company serving many US professional economists:
Teacher’s Insurance and Annuity Association (TIAA). Unit price (the cents
charged per dollar of coverage) is shown across policy size. The figure il-
lustrates that, contrary to canonical theory, but consistent with our more
systematic evidence, TIAA offers bulk discounts in its coverage; the cents
per dollar of award falls with the size of the award.
Not surprisingly, TIAA charges higher premia to insure older or smoking
individuals.4 However, the bulk discount is 10% for awards over a quarter
of a million dollars and 25% for awards greater than one million dollars.
“The price differential creates a incentive for smokers to masquerade as nonsmokers in
5The incentive compatibility constraints in the canonical theory of insurance
under asymmetric information require that unit price rise with the size of
the award, not fall, as illustrated in the figure.
Our results are captured by this simple figure but show a striking robust-
ness across the three data sets. In each, we find that insurance demand is
negatively correlated with unit price, i.e., there are bulk discounts in life in-
surance, as opposed to the positive correlation predicted. It is important to
control for the fact that richer individuals both insure more and live longer
and hence have lower prices of life insurance. The two surveys HRS and
AHEAD are especially useful in this regard because they represent the best
available data source, containing joint observations on mortality risk, income,
and wealth. This permits us to accurately control for income effects on unit
price. We also find that bulk discounts are robust to the use of instruments
which are correlated with mortality but not the loss to be insured.
In each data source we find a negative correlation between risk and the
amount of insurance demanded as well as a striking independence of price and
risk, both findings which are hard to reconcile with the theory. Furthermore,
in HRS and AHEAD we find that a substantial fraction (roughly a quarter)
of the insured hold multiple insurance contracts. This is perhaps the simplest
but strongest evidence against the non-linear pricing predicted by the theory,
Finally, we evaluate the beliefs of the insured by computing the profits
implied if demanders were correct in their mortality beliefs. We find that
profits are close to zero when estimated using actual risks, but positive when
priced according to the beliefs of the insured, suggesting that the insured
underestimate the likelihood of their deaths.
Section 4 discusses the robustness of our conclusions. We discuss the im-
plications of sampling only a subset of the insured population (which is the
case for the ages represented in AHEAD and HRS), the effects of measure-
ment error in the self-perceived risk variable, and the effects of loadings in
prices.
Since our results are not easily explained with existing theory, we con-
clude by discussing the theoretical implications of our findings. We suggest
that the superiority of buyer information is overstated in the standard theory
order to pay lower premia. The potential for such adverse selection is eliminated through
urine and blood tests, which make nicotine consumption common knowledge. ~rthermore,
insurance companies reserve the right to limit awards if misreporting of customers becomes
evident after the death of the insured.of adverse selection; while buyers may have better idiosyncratic information,
sellers may have better systematic information from observing claims across
many buyers. We argue that the information advantage of sellers, as op-
posed to buyers, seems to be more important, and that this has important
implications for the incentives of the insured to learn about their risk.
Our paper relates to several important papers that empirically assess the
extent and implications of trade under asymmetric information. See, e.g.,
Bond (1984), Genesove (1992), Dionne and Doherty (1994), Puelz and Snow
(1994), Foster and Rozensweigh (1993), and Townsend (1996). The impli-
cations discussed and tested here differ from those in that we have data on
what has previously been unobserved: the relationship between self-perceived
and actual risk with the prices and quantities of insurance demanded. Our
evidence on the private information of the insured and their realized risks
allows us to more directly evaluate models of insurance under asymmetric
information.
2 Equilibrium Insurance Under Symmetric Ver-
sus Asymmetric Information
This section outlines the conventional theories of insurance under asymmet-
ric information, especially that of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). We first
describe the theory, and then in four subsections, detail the four restrictions
imposed by this model that will be tested in the subsequent sections.
Let Q denote the quantity of insurance demanded, and q(Q) the unit
price (cents per dollar of coverage); q(Q)Q is the total insurance premium.
Let p be the risk of death for a life insurance applicant in the covered period,
and let L be the dollar amount to be insured, Let W be the initial wealth of
the buyer, where WI and W. signify wealth when the loss does or does not
occur.5
W,= W+ Q- L–q(Q)Q
5Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), the theory tested here, model the demand for life
insurance using stateindependent utility. That is, they model demand as if life insurance
is purch~ed by the policy beneficiaries to protect against a loss of income that would
result from the death of the insured. State dependent utility would apply if one assumed
that life insurance is demanded by the insured for his own benefit, not the benefit of the
policy beneficiaries.
7W. = W - q(Q)Q
If U(W) denotes the Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function, the ex-
pected utility of buying Q units of insurance is
EU(Q) = ~u(~,)+(l-p)U(~o) = p~(~+Q-~-q(Q)Q) +(l-p)u(~-q(Q)Q)
The demand function of insurance is therefore determined by
which satisfies the
equals the relative
Q(P, q, ~, Jv) G A~gmazEU(Q)
familiar condition that the marginal rate of substitution
price
pu’(kv~) l–q’
(1 - p)u’(w,) = q’
As an illustrative example, assume there is no wealth effect, as when the
utility function is U(W) = –ezp( –6W), and that there is no effect of quan-
tity on unit price, as when q(Q) = q. In this case, it is easily shown that
insurance demand equals the potential loss less an amount proportional to
the overpricing of the insurance:
Q(p,q)~,~)=L-;
where R = /n([q/(l – q)]/~/(1 – p)]). Because R = O under fair pricing, R
may be interpreted as a measure of overpricing of insurance.
2.1 Trade Restrictions Under Symmetric Information
The ideal data we will consider allows us to jointly observe (p, q, Q, W, L),
Therefore, we first describe the restrictions imposed upon it. Equilibrium in
competitive insurance markets with symmetric information is characterized
by actuarially fair prices, due to the more general prediction of competitive
prices reflecting average minimum costs. In this case, the unit price of insur-
ance equals the risk of the insured: qs(Q) = p for a person of risk class p.
Under such fair pricing, each person fully insures against the loss.
Q(p)qs, L,W) = L, L < W
8This holds for all concave and state-independent utility functions, which
imply a preference for smoothing wealth over states, If competition holds
prices at a fair level, then this implies that across customers each purchases
the same quantity of insurance, irrespective of unit price they are charged.
The reduced-form demand function is completely inelastic with respect to
the unit price of insurance and risk:
dQ
dq~
–=0 ~ =0
This is true because risk and unit price are perfectly correlated; while those
of higher risk have a higher marginal utility of insurance, this is exactly offset
by higher prices. Naturally, within a risk class demand curves are downward
sloping, but across risk classes equilibrium demand does not covary with the
unit price charged.
2.2 Trade Restrictions Under Asymmetric Information
Canonical theories of insurance under asymmetric information do not imply
that demand is invariant to unit price. Instead, they predict that those of
low risk are quantity constrained in the presence of those of higher risk, This
occurs because insurers market contracts to the lower risk customers that are
undesirable to those with higher risk. In their choice of contract size, appli-
cants reveal their riskiness, and insurers can charge them accordingly.G This
implies that the unit price function under asymmetric information, denoted
q,4(Q), increases with the quantity of insurance purchased ~ > 0. The
important consequence of this is that, in contrast to the case of symmetric
information, quantity is positively correlated with the risk of the insured as
well as with the unit price.
dQ>o ~>.
dqA dp
Since the relationship between unit price and risk is just the compounded
effect of the two, the unit price covaries with risk w well, since dqA/dp =
(dqA/dQ)(dQ/dp) ~ O.
6For ~ detailed discussion of the incentive compatibility constraints imposed by screen-
ing models, see Riley (1979) and Mailath (1987).
9Although these results hold for a continuum of risk classes, it is more
simply illustrated for the case of two risk classes, p and ~, in Figure 2. The —
symmetric information contracts are (L, gL) and (L, qL) at which there is
full insurance at fair and constant unit prices q = p an~ ~ = P. This implies
the zero covariation across buyers between unit ~rice and quantity. The
asymmetric information contracts are (L, gL) and (C, qC), where C is the —
constrained quantity of the low risk CIWS. Smaller contracts are sold at lower
unit prices; the reduced-form demand function is upward sloping due to the
positive covariance between price and quantity across customers.
Thus, in contrast with the symmetric information case, under asymmetric
information, holding insurable loss L constant, the quantity of insurance
exchanged is correlated with the unit price as well as the risk of the insured:
~>Oand~>O. .
In equilibriu~ the marginal benefit of insurance must equal its marginal
cost for all risk classes; this is possible if the pricing function qA(Q) assigns
higher unit prices for larger insurance contracts (i.e., it is convex). If the cost
function is concave, then there exist bulk discounts and the type of separating
equilibrium described by Rothschild and Stiglitz cannot exist because the
pricing schedule is not incentive compatible due to the incentives for the low
risk to not buy their contract.
A crucial assumption of the separating equilibrium described above is that
it is impossible to purchase multiple contracts. To illustrate using Figure 2,
if multiple contracts are allowed, then high risks may demand a number L/C
of the C-sized contracts and reduce their total premia from q(L)L to g(C)L.
However, the purchwe by the high risk of a contract priced for the low risk
would make the contract unprofitable for the insurer and hence cannot be
an equilibrium. While some insurance companies require may applicants to
list any policies that they hold, this may be for other reasons than to cap
insurance purchases, and the systematic impact of this practice is an open
empirical question.
Note that competitive equilibria under symmetric and asymmetric in-
formation both imply perfect correlation between risk and unit price. To
make this more precise, let the mean of unit prices conditional on risk be
10approximated by the linear Taylor expansion
E[plq] = T()+ ~~q
Then both symmetric and asymmetric information models imply that the
coefficients are restricted according to ~. = O and ~1 = 1
2.3 The Restriction of Profitable Insurance
A competitive equilibrium restriction imposed by all theories of insurance is
naturally that sellers earn non-negative profits. However, when consumers
are as well informed w assumed in the theory of ~ymmetric information then
if the self-perceived risk of the insured is accurate, then the profits induced
by these beliefs must be non-negative as well. Evaluating the profits at the
self-perceived risk one gets
~=/Q(P)(,(P)-P/(I +T))~F(P) 20
where r is the yearly interest rate and Q(p) and q(p) are the quantity and
unit price of risk class p in equilibrium. Profits are larger the more the future
is discounted because insurers receive the premia before paying any awards.
If the fact that a given policy is traded is proof of its profitability with respect
to actual tisk, then this restriction can be used to test whether buyers of in-
surance have better information than sellers about their risk. Specifically,
if the self-perceived risk induces the insured imply negative profits, then we
can reject the hypothesis that the risk beliefs of the insured are accurate.
Note that such tests for positive subjective profits may be performed on risk
classes conditionally E[n Ip] or unconditionally E[T]. Rejecting non-negative
profits conditionally amounts to rejecting the joint hypothesis of correct in-
formation of buyers and no cross-subsidies, and rejecting non-negative profits
unconditionally amounts to rejecting correct information of buyers.
3 Tests of Restrictions using Data on Self-
Perceived and Actual Risk
This section empirically investigates the discussed restrictions using data that
allows us to jointly observe the self-perceived and actual risk of the insured
and the quantities and prices of their insurance.
113.1 The Data Sources
We use public release data from the first waves of the Health and Retirement
Study (HRS) 7, and the Asset and Health Dynamics Among the Oldest Old
(AHEAD).8 Both studies examine health, retirement, and economic status,
but the HRS sample is drawn from persons who are between 51 and 61 and the
AHEAD sample from persons above 70.9 Both studies over-sampled African-
Americansl Hispanics, and residents of Florida, but we use sample weights to
produce a nationally representative sample. There were 12,652 respondents
from 7,702 households in HRS and 8,223 respondents from 6,052 households
in AHEAD.
It is important to stress that our empirical analysis is concerned with
an individual spot market in life insurance since that type of market is the
domain of the theory. 10 Specifically, we restrict our analysis to term life
insurance, the annual premia of which are structured to cover annual outlays;
term policies do not build cash value. 11 In other words, the annual unit
price of term life insurance equals the insurance company’s estimate of the
probability that the insured will die in the next year.12 We excluded those
with group insurance policies since their premia reflect not only their own risk
but also that of the rest of the group. A total of 2,230 respondents in HRS
reported owning individual term life insurance and 1305 AHEAD respondents
report paying premia for any term life insurance; the latter were not asked
‘University of Michigan Survey Research Center, May, 1995.
‘University of Michigan Survey Research Center, December 1994.
‘In both studies, spouses of age-eligible respondents were interviewed. We drop obser-
vations on spouses who were not themselves age eligible.
10There are several types of life insurance contracts. The most common is called ordinary
and totaled $111,600 per U.S. household representing 58% of all life insurance. Ordinary
life insurance comes in two varieties: whole life and term. Whole life covers the insured
for life and represents 62% of ordinary policies. Term life coverage, the remaining 38% of
ordinary policies, lasts for a specific period of time and payment occurs only if insured dies
within that period. Individual term life policyholders pay the entire premium, as opposed
to holders of group insurance, who may pay only a small fraction of the total premium,
with the rest paid by an employer or union.
1‘We dropped from our sample those who are unsure whether their life insurance is
whole life or term; however, we also estimated our models with that group included in our
sample and the results are not significantly different.
lzRenewable term policies increase premia with each year of renewal ~ decre~ing term
policies lower the award. Level term policies offer a constant premium for several years.
12whether their policies are individual or group. However, evidence suggests
that they are mainly individual policies; group life insurance is generally
offered through employment and the vast majority of the AHEAD sample
is retired. Evidence from the non-age-eligible spouses in HRS for whom we
know the type of policy and who resemble our AHEAD sample supports this
hypothesis: of HRS respondents aged 70 or over who pay premia for some
term insurance, 75% (of 35 observations) have individual policies.
Tables 1A through lD display summary statistics of variables used in this
paper. Table 1A reports the statistics for the entire age-eligible AHEAD and
13”Table lB corresponds to the uninsured in both samples, Ta- HRS samples ,
ble lC to term life insurance holders, and Table ID to those holding multiple
term life insurance policies.
Of particular importance is the self-perceived risk of the insured. AHEAD
respondents were asked: “Using a number from O to 100, what do you think
are the chances that you will live to be at least [90, 95, or 100, depending on
the age of the respondent] .“ HRS respondents were asked: “Using a number
from O to 10, where O equals absolutely no chance and 10 equals absolutely
certain, what do you think are the chances that you will live to be 75 or
more? And how about the chances that you will live to be 85 or more?” 14
In order to be compared to annual premia in the individual spot market
we analyze, these beliefs about future mortality must be converted to beliefs
about mortality in one year. The Appendix details how we derived self-
perceived one-year mortality hazards, and the table reports the results for
two hazard models that were used to convert future mortality beliefs into
current ones. One is a constant hazard model and the other is a linear one,
and since the latter allows for growth in mortality hazards, it will lead to lower
current levels. However, for some of our results we only retain the assumption
that the order of risk is preserved across time when using dummies for the
ten reported risk levels.
The unit price of a policy 9(Q) was estimated by dividing the reported
annual term insurance premium (q(Q)Q) by the term insurance award. In
13We drop respondents that failed to report mortality beliefs.
14Hurd and McGarry (1995) and Hamermesh (1985) conclude that survival estimates
similar to these behave like probabilities, are close to life table averages, and covary with
health and socioeconomic variables in the same manner as do actual survivals.
13AHEAD, respondents were asked about the characteristics of their largest
term policy only, and of all of their whole life policies combined. In HRS,
they were asked to report the total award and premia of all of their term
policies, the total award on all of their whole life insurance, and the premia
on only the largest two whole life insurance policies.
We are not able to estimate actual risk for AHEAD because only one
wave of that study is currently available. However, we were able to estimate
actual risk for HRS.15 We computed actual mortality risk as the fitted value
of a logit regression of experienced mortality between the two waves of HRS
on demographic and health characteristics. 16 Because there was sample at-
trition and since we do not know whether attrited members are still alive,
we computed two measures of fitted risk: an upper bound on mortality for
which attrited sample members were assumed to be dead, and a lower bound
on mortality for which attrited sample members were assumed to be alive.
In HRS, the number of children is derived by adding the number of chil-
dren reported living at home and the number reported to be living away from
home. In AHEAD, respondents were asked the number of children they had
ever had. For both surveys, respondents were asked how many living siblings
and grandchildren they have.
Both HRS and AHEAD have extremely detailed measures of income and
wealth. While HRS and AHEAD attempted to interview all spouses, it asked
for financial information about both spouses from only one of the respondents
in the household. In AHEAD, total family income represents the couple’s
combined income, before taxes, for the year 1992 or 1993, depending on the
time of the interview. In HRS, total family income equals the total household
income for 1991; this is the sum of earnings, unemployment and workers’
compensation, pensions, annuities, SS1, welfare, capital income, disability
income, and unspecified “other” income.
In AHEAD, the loss of income from the death of the insured was directly
15We thank David Weir and HR.S for providing us with the preliminary HRS data on
mortality.
16The regressors in the Iogit regression include: age, squared age, height, weight, the
first principal component of three measures of cognitive awareness, and dummy variables
for: female, black, white, married, diabetes, smokes now, ever smoked, drinks alcohol,
cancer, lung diseme, heart disease, stroke, psychiatric problems, arthritis, asthma, back
problems, kidney tilments, ulcers, high cholesterol, broken bones after age 45, high blood
pressure, eyeglasses, and a hospital stay in the last year.
14me~ured and was defined to include the pre-tax wages of the insured in
1992/93 plus the net annual loss that death would cause in the top three reg-
ular income sources (e.g., pensions, Veterans Benefits, and annuities). Net
loss can be determined because respondents were asked the current amount
of the payments, and how much (if anything) their spouse would continue to
receive from that source if they were to die. In HRS, the loss of income from
death of the insured was estimated as the insured’s annual income from veter-
ans’ benefits, pensions, annuities, SS1, wages and salaries, bonuses, overtime,
tips and commissions, professional practice, second jobs, military reserves,
unemployment compensation, workers compensation, and social security (in-
cluding disability, survivors benefits, and retirement). Unlike AHEAD, HRS
does not record how much income a spouse would continue to receive from
these sources if the insured dies.
The wealth variable constitutes assets minus debts. Assets include
retirement accounts, savings accounts, checking accounts, stocks, mutual
funds, CDs, bonds, Treasury bills, money market funds, annuities, other in-
vestments, accounts receivable, real estate, cars, boats, airplanes, businesses,
jewelry, and unspecified “other” assets. Debts include mortgages, credit card
balances, medical debt, loans from relatives, life insurance policy loans, and
unspecified “other” debt,
The detailed financial measures in these surveys are important since the
restrictions discussed are conditional on the level of loss L, wealth W, and
other components of demand such as the number of living relatives (who can
provide assistance to survivors and also maybe recipients of future bequests).
An accurate me~ure of the financial loss that would result from the death
of the insured is particularly elusive, because altruistic family members may
step in and partially offset the financial losses (e.g., wage and pension income)
that stem from the death of the insured.
There are advantages unique to each data set. The HRS specifies whether
term policies are individual or group, and asks all respondents their beliefs
about living to two ages. The AHEAD better measures the financial loss
that would result from the death of the respondent,
3.2 Tests of the Price and Quantity Restrictions
In this section, we examine the restrictions on the correlation of unit price
and quantity of insurance. The first set of evidence comes from a data source
15that uniquely captures this relationship, the 1994 Buger’s Siudyby LIMRA
International, which examined a random sample of the 28 thousand new
17 This sample contains a limited policies issued in the US by 47 companies.
set of the demographic characteristics of the buyers of the policies as well
as features of those policies including award size and premia. Figures 3 A-B
below plot the unit price as a function of the award size broken down by
age and annual income of buyer. The first figure plots the unit prices across
award sizes for different ages and the second for different income classes.
Although, the data plotted in these figures is not conditioned on any
other characteristics that may determine the unit price, they both display
the pattern that the unit price falls with the size of the policy. Unit price falls
by an average of 80.8% per $1000 insured “inFigure 3A and by an average of
89.8% in Figure 3B.
Although this evidence is consistent with bulk discounts, the pattern
might disappear after controlling more fully for potential factors that affect
both unit price and the demand for insurance. Therefore, we go on to test
for bulk discounts using the
individual-level data of AHEAD and HRS. Since the restrictions we dis-
cussed concerned the reduced-form demand function across different risk
classes, we consider the basic reduced-form specification
lnQ = Po +Dqq+ @wW+PLL
Our discussed restriction is conditional on all loss and wealth determinants
of insurance demand. However, loss and wealth have components that are
observable and unobservable to the survey, as in L = (XL, UL) and W =
(XW, UW) where X’s correspond to observable and U’s to unobservable.
For example, components of observable loss include Social Security and pen-
sion payments and those of observable wealth include housing and financial
assets. The b~ic coefficient of interest is ~~ which measures the degree to
which, controlling for the loss and wealth of the individual, unit price is corre-
lated with reduced form demand; it is predicted to be zero under symmetric
17For a complete description of the survey see The Buyers Study nited States
A Market Study of New Insureds and the Ordinay Life Insurance Purchased, LIMRA
International, Windsor, CT.
16information and positive when low-risk types are quantity constrained as
predicted under asymmetric information. Naturally, the zero effect of price
on demand does not hold within a given risk class when demand curves slope
downward, but concerns the demand across risks.
Tables 2A and 2B, columns 1 and 2, report the coefficient estimates of
successively larger sets of reduced form specifications, testing whether the
unit price covaries with insurance demand, controlling for the loss and wealth
of the insured. Unit price is a function of age, but it is important to include
age = a regressor in addition to unit price because the quantity of insurance
purchased falls with age, as there is less income lost from the death of the
insured, and age is probably the most important observable, as opposed to
unobservable, factor used by insurers to set unit price. Therefore, even if
there was fair pricing, there could appear a negative relationship between
quantity and unit price if one did not control for age effects on insurance
demand.
The major result reported in the table is that the correlation of unit price
and quantity is statistically significantly and negative; in other words, Tables
2 suggest bulk discounts. This result is opposite to the predictions of models
of insurance under symmetric or asymmetric information. As we increase the
amount of controls for loss, wealth, age of spouse, and size of family, unit
price still remains statistically significant and negative. 19
If higher unobserved wealth leads to better health and larger insurance
purchases, then the negative correlation between unit prices and quantities
reported in columns 1 and 2 of the two tables may be spurious. However,
little income and wealth are left unrecorded in HRS and AHEAD; detailed
measurement of assets and income was one of the major objectives of these
surveys. Therefore, we believe that the income streams unmeasured by these
surveys are relatively small, in particular, smaller than any other available
data with comparable mortality information.
Even so, we re-estimated the models of Table 2 using several instruments
for unit price which we believe are correlated with mortality risk but not with
laAll tests in this paper use the 570 significance level.
lgIn results not included here, we interacted unit price with the age, gender, race, and
wealth of the insured. The interactions proved statistically insignificant, and the unit price
remained significant and negative.
17unobserved components of wealth and loss (the results appear in columns 3
and 4 of Tables 2). For the AHEAD sample we used several instruments:
height, the age of each parent at death, age, and dummies that equal one if the
respondent has diabetes, and has living parents. In AHEAD age is assumed
to be uncorrelated with unobservable income because sample members are at
least 70 years old and generally on annuitized income. For the HRS sample
we used as instruments height and a dummy variable which equalled one if
the respondent has diabetes. We could not use age w an instrument because
the HRS sample is of working age; age could be correlated with unobserved
income. We regressed unit price on the instruments, and fitted values of unit
price were computed following a standard two-stage least squares method,
Our instruments are not highly correlated with unit price; the R-squared is
.04 in the HRS, and .08 in the AHEAD, samples.
Tables 2A and 2B, columns 3 and 4, indicate that fitted unit price,
like unit price itself, has a statistically significant and negative correlation
with the quantity of insurance. In HRS, but not AHEAD, this is robust to
the inclusion of controls for the number of family members, wealth, family
income and loss.zo Overall, the results of the two tables seem to suggest
bulk di~counts in life insurance.
3.3 Tests of the Risk and Quantity Restrictions
Insurance under symmetric information, controlling for the wealth and loss
of the insured, implies that risk should be uncorrelated with the demand for
insurance. Under asymmetric information, however, risk and the quantity of
insurance should be positively related. Table 3 examines these restrictions
using actual and self-perceived risk from AHEAD and HRS. Table 3 contains
specifications of the reduced-form relationship of the type
lnQ = BO+ PPP + BwW + PLL
where P is either self-perceived or actual mortality risk.
201f the log of the total quantity of insurance held, that is, the sum of whole life and
term coverage, is used as the dependent variable in these specifications, the coefficient on
unit price is either significant and negative or statistically insignificant.
18We used twomethods to construct the self-perceived risk variable. The
first method is described in the Appendix as a method for estimating a one-
year hazard. The second method avoids the parametric issues involved in
converting the future mortality belief into the one-year probability by using
decile dummies [0,0.1,..,1.0] for the beliefs reported in AHEAD and HRS.
This method avoids the problems inherent in a conversion of future beliefs
into current beliefs. Using these dummy variables, we investigate whether
those with higher beliefs of death in the future, who by most methods would
have a higher belief of death in a year, demand relatively more insurance
controlling for loss and wealth. In Table 3, the dummies mewure the effects
relative to the omitted category of a certainty of death. As Table 3A indi-
cates, the results are similar whether one uses the linear hazard or the risk
dummies. The correlation between risk and quantity of insurance is signifi-
cant and negative for the HRS sample, and not statistically significant for the
AHEAD sample. Both of these findings contradict the positive relationship
predicted by insurance under asymmetric information.
Table 3B contains the analogous specification for the actual risk of the
insured in HRS, as measured by their predicted probability of dying between
the first and second wave of this survey. The columns (1) and (2) of the
table contain the estimates for the upper bound on mortality treating as
dead all those attriting from the survey between wave 1 and 2. The columns
(3) and (4) are the corresponding results when those attriting are treated
as alive. Again, we find a negative reduced-form relationship between risk
and quantity of insurance. However, in all columns, actual risk is not sta-
tistically significant. Again, our results do not support the canonical theory
prediction of a positive and significant correlation between risk and quantity
of insurance.
3.4 Tests of the Risk and Average Price Restrictions
The third set of restrictions we discussed and investigate here concerns the
joint distribution of risk and unit price. Figures 4A and 4B display the joint
frequency over self-perceived risk and unit price pairs (p, q) for the HRS and
AHEAD samples. The figure displays the whisker plots of self-perceived risk
19as a function of the percentiles of the unit price variable. zl Under asymmetric
and symmetric information, a strong covariance was predicted between the
two variables, but the distributions displayed by the whisker plots indicate a
different relationship.
Indeed, as opposed to the theory’s prediction, the self-perceived mortality
beliefs of buyers seem almost uncorrelated with unit price. The regressions
of self-perceived risk on unit price that correspond to the figure indicate that
the correlation is statistically significant, but the R-squared is less than .02
for both samples and both measures of self-perceived risk (the constant and
linear hazard models).
The same pattern is present in Figures 5A and 5B below, which compare
the self-perceived mortality risk with actual mortality risk between the two
waves in HRS. The first figure 5A is for the larger actual mortality risk when
those attriting are assumed dead, as opposed to the second figure 5B, which
is when they are assumed alive.
Again, contrary to the theory, there appears to be no correlation between
self-perceived and actual risk. The regressions of self-perceived on actual risk
that correspond to these figures indicate that the correlation is statistically
significant, but the R-squared is .03 or less for both measures of actual risk
and both measures of self-perceived risk. This result suggests that the asym-
metric information advantage of consumers is not present in these data.22
3.5 Tests of the Single-Contract Restriction
Perhaps the simplest but most convincing argument against the canonical
theory is that it is incompatible with people holding multiple insurance con-
tracts, If the high-risk can buy several of the small, cheap contracts designed
21 The whisker plot depicts the median, 25th and 75th percentiles, and bounds made up
of 3/2 times these percentiles.
22Wilson (1977) and others have studied equilibrium cross-subsidies, in which low-risk
individuals obtain the best possible contract by cross-subsidizing the risky. Cross subsidies
by low-risk groups may be observed because they are willing to compensate high-risks
to obtain higher coverage than when they are quantity constrained. Such cross-subsidy
restrictions imply coefficients on risk and price less than unity.
20for the low-risk, there should be no demand at higher quantities. For ex-
ample, under the price schedules predicted under asymmetric information, it
would be cheaper to buy two half-million-dollar contracts than a one-million-
dollar one. Figure 6 reports the number of term insurance contracts held by
our HRS and AHEAD sample members.
The figure depicts
well as the distribution
the overall distribution on the extensive margin as
for equally-sized high-, medium-, and low-risk sample
members. The figure suggests that multiple contracting is clearly feasible;23
roughly a third of those who hold term insurance hold multiple contracts.
Furthermore, multiple contracting seems independent of risk. The latter
finding is important because it says that high risk individuals are not more
likely to engage in multiple contracting.24
3.6 Tests of The Profit Restriction
This section tests the last restriction that the profits implied by the beliefs
of the insured must be non-negative. The estimated per-capita profit for
different contracts are reported in Tables 4 A-D for HRS and AHEAD. The
first column contains the sample size and the second reports profits under the
lower and upper bounds of r = O % and r = 10 % yearly interest. Because
premia are received before claims are paid, the larger the interest rate, the
higher the estimated profits of the insurer.
23Furthermore, the total quantity of insurance rises with number of contracts held.
241f unit prices fall with quantity then it is not clear why multiple contracts are held
by such a large portion of the sample. One possibility is a quantity constraint that op-
erates independently of price and risk. In our data there is no relationship between risk,
whether self-perceived or actual and the number of contracts held. In both surveys, the
average self-perceived risk is identical for those holding one versus multiple term contracts.
Similarly, the average actual risk is same for both groups in HRS. A logit regression in
which the dependent variable reflects whether a person holds one or many contracts, which
is regressed on demographic chmacteristics as well as risk also indicates no relationship
between risk and the number of contracts held.
21The risk beliefs of the insured imply positive profits when a linear hazard
is used; we cannot reject the hypothesis that the beliefs are accurate. How-
ever, the profitability result is highly sensitive to the way in which mortality
beliefs about the future are converted into mortality beliefs about the next
year. For example, if we use a constant hazard, instead of linear hazard,
model, insurers appear to lose over $1100 per customer. The difference is
attributable to the fact that fewer people are predicted to die in the next
year with a linear hazard model than a constant hazard.
4 Features Affecting the Robustness of Our
Analysis
This section discusses the robustness of our results to features of
survey design which affect the degree of measurement error and which
observable are collected.
4.1 Loadings on Insurance Prices
The restrictions we tested were derived with the assumption that prices were
actuarially fair—meaning that revenues equalled the awards. The compet-
itive market prediction is that prices equal the average minimum costs of
production, which corresponds to fair pricing whenever the non-award costs
of producing the contracts, e.g., wages of employees or regulation ,25are small
on a per-insured basis. To assess the fairness assumption directly we used our
direct measures of risk for HRS to calculate average profits per customer. We
found that zero profits could not be rejected at standard levels of significance.
However, even when such costs are not small on a per-insured basis, the
loadings may not affect our results. For example, under the common as- ,
sumption that loadings are constant across the insured, on a percentage or
absolute buis, then the correlations between unit prices and the discussed
risks are unaffected; loaded prices are simply linear transformations of un-
loaded ones. Furthermore, the results on the sorting of risk classes across
25Pauly and Finsinger (1986) document that the premia are virtually unregulated; reg-
ulation mainly concerns reserve requirements.
22quantities of insurance, whether self-perceived or actual risk, does not con-
cern prices and hence is independent of any such loading on prices. However,
the levels of the premia are affected by loadings and therefore our profit tests
are sensitive to loadings. Specifically, loading raises our measure of the risk
beliefs of insurers (unit price) and makes insurers seem more profitable; this
increases the chance of Type II error in the profitability test.
One possible explanation of the bulk discounts is that loadings, such as
medical exams in the case of life insurance, are spread across a cent ract, and
have a lesser effect on unit price the larger the contract. The fixed costs in
life insurance are referred to as the policy fee of the contract and for term
insurance ranges between $50-100 per policy in 1996. For example, consider
the pricing of the TIAA contracts depicted in Figure 1. Suppose that its unit
prices are made up of a fixed policy fee of size F, plus a fair component, as
in q(Q) = (F + pQ)/Q = F/Q + p. Then the unit price is decreasing and
converges to the true risk, q(Q) + p, as awards increase. The TIAA bulk
discounts of 10 and 25 percent, regardless of age, then reveal the levels and
determinants of such fixed costs for TIAA. In particular, if for high enough
quantities, fixed costs are negligible (q(Q) = p), then if Q. denotes a mid-
size policy that does not enjoy any bulk discount then we must have that
the relationship (F/Q. + p)/p = l/d, or equivalently F = [(1 – d)Qo/d]p,
holds whenever large claims are discounted at d%. This implies that the
absolute level of fixed costs must be risk dependent, e.g., increasing in age,
which seems unlikely. Second, inserting reasonable levels for TIAA such as a
mortality hazard of one percent (p = 0.01), a mid range claim of Q. = 150K,
and a discount of d = .75 for claims for which fixed costs may be ignored,
one gets the level of the fixed cost F = [(.25) 150/.75]p = 50p. In other
words, for each percentage increase in the mortality rate, the fixed cost goes
up by 500 dollars. These fixed costs seem excessive, and also it is not clear
why they increase with risk. Regardless of the reason for a bulk discount, its ,
existence is strong evidence against the separating equilibrium described by
Rothschild and Stiglitz.
4.2 Conditioning by Suppliers and Econometricians
Our data is conditional on a subset of the insured population. In particular,
the two surveys we studied are limited to ages 51-61 for HRS and over 70 for
AHEAD, although of course term insurance is sold for all ages. If a sampled
23population differs in unobservable respects from the non-sampled population
there may be cross-subsidies. If the sample is conditional on a characteristic
that is observable to insurers, which presumably age is, then competition
makes cross-subsidies unlikely between the sampled and the non-sampled
population. 26 Hence, the fact that both HRS and AHEAD are conditional
on a subset of possible ages does not discount our findings, if there is full
competition to insure these age categories. Furthermore, although the full
support of ages is not sampled, the full support of risks may be observed,
as there is considerable variance of risk conditional on the ages sampled.
Since both unit prices and risk, i.e., q and p, are observed, there are no
omitted variables with respect to risk. There may be omitted variables that
are correlated with both the demand for insurance and wealth or loss, but
there is no risk-related variable missing; we observe the risk itself.
Consider testing for the discussed restrictions when there are multiple
observable groups. Let X be a finite set of observable categories that de-
termines the mortality risk of the insured. For example, if there are only
two observable classes so that X is a gender dummy, say X = 1 for females
and X = Ofor males, then we interpret the restrictions discussed to be con-
ditioned on observable, that is, to hold both within the male and within
the female group of insured customers. Since the econometrician may only
observe a subset of all the variables that are observable to the supplier, it is
useful to analyze how this affects the results.
Figure 7 below illustrates the effects of the econometrician not observing
all observable of the supplier who in turn, under asymmetric information,
does not observe all that the buyer observes. The figure represents demand
and price combinations conditional on a given pair of wealth and loss levels
(W, L). It concerns the simplest c~e when the econometrician can condition
on a binary dummy variable Z (e.g., gender), the seller can condition on a
dummy X (e.g., medical test), and the buyer on a dummy U (e.g., a parental ,
health condition). The risks are abbreviated pzu for X = z and U = U, with
the risk conditional on only an observable category p=.
In the first scenario represented by the first column there is symmetric
information between the supply and demand side, both know X but neither
2aThe sample is clearly not self-selected since age cannot be chosen,
24knows U. In the second scenario represented by the second column there
is asymmetric information between suppliers and demanders such that both
know X but only demanders know U. The first column specifies the predicted
quantity and price pairs when neither the seller nor the buyer can condition
on U. The second column specifies the traded quantities and prices when
only the buyer observes U where Q(p) is the quantity demanded by risk
p. The figure illustrates several important points on whether the discussed
restrictions can be inferred when the econometrician does not condition on
something that the sellers conditions on, that is, X in the figure. Suppose the
econometrician did not observe X and wanted to test whether the symmetric
information condition dQ/dq = O held. Since this condition holds whether
one conditions on X or not, rejecting it unconditionally implies rejecting
for some value of X conditionally. In other words, if the econometrician
rejects the null when omitting controls of the seller, he still rejects the null.
Under asymmetric information Q(p) and p are monotonically related, which
implies that whenever this monotonicity holds conditional on a value of X,
it holds unconditionally because-the underl ying risk is ordered across states.
In other words, the ranking of all the states from high to low risk coincides
with the ranking of all of them from low to high quantity. This implies that
conditional on an X the relationship is monotonically increasing. However,
if the econometrician could not control on X, the relationship would still be
increasing. Therefore, the sign of the covariance between price and quantity
is preserved when the econometrician does not control for all the controls of
the seller.27
27More generally we have that, since controls in regressions correspond to different
condition sets, if M is a discrete set of characteristics of the demanders, let @E, 0.s, and
@D be partitions of ~ representing information sets of the econometrician, the supply-
-side, respective the demmd side, where @E is coarser than *.s, which in turn is coarser
than @E, as in Figure 6. Given wealth and loss levels (W, L), under symmetric information
no covariation of (Q, q) when conditioning on OS implies no covariation when conditioning
on *E. Under asymmetric information, a monotonic relationship between Q and p on @D
implies a monotonic relationship conditioning on @E.
254.3 Expectations Data and Measurement Errors
An important issue that may be raised against any study using expectations
dataza is that the self-reported mortality beliefs involve me~urement error.
However, if individuals are unable to use their beliefs to accurately respond
to a survey, it seems unlikely that they can utilize it to such a sophisticated
extent that market breakdowns will occur because of adverse selection. The
conventional approach of assessing the quality of expectations data is to see
if it influences behavior, in this case, the quantity of insurance demanded.
However, in the context of insurance, the supply side has to be taken into
account. In particular, under fair pricing, expectations are uncorrelated with
insurance demand, so determining whether the self-reported mortality beliefs
are useful by looking at whether they affect insurance demand involves a joint
hypothesis regarding data quality and market behavior.zg
In assessing how conventional measurement errors affect the results, con-
sider when the measured unit price ~ and mortality belief j are related to
the true values, as in
Q=q+qq
where q~ and qp are independent and mean zero errors.30
First, such errors will bias the estimated effect of risk on insurance de-
mand towards zero which suggests that if reported risk is measured with
error, the effects we find must be underestimated (in absolute terms). Sec-
ond, our test for fair pricing follows from
‘sFor previous work using qualitative expectations data, see e.g., Nerlove (1983), Carlson
and Parkin (1975), and Jacobs and Jones (1980) on firm expectations, ad for recent work
using quantitative expectations data for households see, e.g., Dominitz and Manski (1995, j
1996), Hu.rd and McGarry (1996), and Hamermesh (1985).
‘gAny test of an economic hypothesis is a test of the joint hypothesis involving the
data production process and the economic hypothesis itself (see Philipson (1995)). The
difference between attitudinal and behavioral measures is that the latter can in principle
be externally validated. If no external validation takes plme, the common case in empirical
economics,’ then there seems to be no difference between the two.
30Since @and ~ are bounded, the vmiance cannot be equal across p and q unless it is
zero.
26The conditional mean function, although not the conditional variance, is the
same. Last ly, the effect on estimated profit levels is somewhat different. The
observed profits under measurement errors are given by
fi=/(Q-@/(l+~))Q~~(F,l)
When measurement errors have zero means this yields
fi=~(*-~/(l+~))Q~~(~+n,~+
Therefore, a sufficient condition for profits observed with error to be positive
is that q z p holds almost surely, in which case 7 ~ Ois implied. Measure-
ment error increases the likelihood of Type II error, that is, to accept that
the mortality information of the insured is superior when it is not.
5 Conclusion
Using data on not only quantities and prices of insurance, but also on the
self-perceived and actual risk of persons demanding life insurance, we tested
several restrictions implied by the theory of insurance under both symmet-
ric and asymmetric information. We found evidence of bulk discounts in
insurance; that is, unit prices fall at higher quantities of insurance. Further-
more, we found a negative correlation between self-perceived risk, actual risk,
and the quantity of insurance. We also found a lack of covariation between
self-perceived and actual risk with unit price. Most dramatically, we found
substantial evidence of multiple contracting, which indicates that unit prices
that rise with quantity seem unlikely to be present. The results of our profit
tests of the accuracy of buyer beliefs are inconclusive and sensitive to the
way in which we convert a belief of mortality over several years into a belief ‘
about mortality in one year.
Our findings suggest several theoretical directions that may develop to
better understand the discussed patterns in the data. We believe that canoni-
cal models of insurance exaggerate the superiority of the buyer’s information
relative to that of sellers. The handsome wages commanded by actuaries
proves that knowledge of systematic, as opposed to idiosyncratic, mortality
2731 More importantly, the information information is highly valued by insurers.
acquisition of the two sides of the market may interact: if insurers acquire
much information, this may provide a disincentive for information acquisition
by the insurance applicants. Because insurers may require access to medical
records, applicants have a disincentive to have medical conditions diagnosed;
that might encourage the insurer to charge a higher premium. When infor-
mation acquisition is endogenous, the information asymmetry may actually
be to the advantage of the insurer due to economies of scale.
31The classic reference on how to use such systematic knowledge about customer char-
acteristics to set premia is Shepherd and Webster (1957).
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31A APPENDIX: Computation of One-Year Self-
Perceived Mortality Risk
In both HRS and AHEAD, respondents provided a subjective belief of sur-
vival S(t) after t years. We converted these into one-year probabilities ac-
cording to the constant and linear hazard models:
S(t) = ezp(–ht) + h = –ZnS(t)/t * pC = 1- S(1) = 1- erp(–h)
S(t) = ezp(–ht2/2) - h = -21nS(t)/t2 * pl = 1 – S(1) = 1 – ezp(–h/2).
In the first model, the hazard function is constant across ages h(t) = h, while
in the second model the hazard increases linearly over time h(t) = h * t.
Survival probabilities of unity p = 1 (21% in AHEAD and 7.2% in HRS)
are problematic for our constant hazard rate model because a certainty of
death after many years is converted into a certainty of death in the next year.
Furthermore, 11,7% of our AHEAD and 23% of our HRS samples reported
zero probability y of death.
32Table 1A: Summary Statistics and Definitions of Variables
For Entire Sample -
AHEAD Variables
Buyer’s Belief (p) -- linear hazard model
Buyer’s Belief (p) -- constant hazard model
Buyer’s Es[imate of Mulliyear Survival
Unit Price of Term Insurance (q)
Own Term Life Insurance (dummy)
Number of Term Life Policies Held
Term Life Insurance Annual Premium
Term Life Insurance Award (Q)
Own Whole Life Insurance (dummy)
Number of Whole Life Policies Held
Whole Life Insurance Annual Premium
Whole Life Insurance Award
Number of Grandchildren
Number of Siblings
Number of Children
Married (dummy)
“Age of Spouse (if married)
Age
White (dummy)
Black (dummy)
Female (dummy)
Annual Family Income
Wealth (W)
Loss of Income from Death of Insured (L)
HRS Variables
Buyer’s Belief (p) -- linear hazard model
Buyer’s Belief (p) -- constant hazard model
Buyer’s Estimate of Multiyear Survival
Actual Risk (Lower Bound)
Actual Risk (Upper Bound)
Unit Price (q)
Own Term Life Insurance (dummy)
Number of Term Life Policies Held
Term Life Insurance Annual Premium
Term Life Insurance Award (Q)
Own Whole Life Insurance (dummy)
Number of Whole Life Policies Held
Whole Life Insurance Annual Premium
Whole Life Insurance Award
Number of Grandchildren
Number of Siblings
Number of Children
Married (dummy)
Age of Spouse (if married)
Age
White (dummy)
Black (dummy)
Female (dummy)
Annual Family Income
Weallh (W)
Loss of Income from Death of Insured (L)
N
5434
5434
5434
786
5430
5421
849
1669
5430
5412
794
1280
5368
5424
5434
5434
2695
5434
5434
5434
5434
5434
5434
5434
N
9014
9014
9014
8326
8326
2903
9014
8973
2775
3920
9014
8998
2080
2622
8790
8790
8790
9014
6162
9014
9014
9014
9014
8896
8896
9014
m
0.013
0.142
41.472
0.072
0.339
0.467
0.350
7.529
0.264
0.436
0.001
20.018
5.520
2.051
2.572
0.503
73.593
76.548
0.908
0.079
0.613
24.057
200.234
4.747
W
0.003
0.043
6.455
0.014
0.031
0.021
0,495
0.653
0.533
61.801
0.341
0.503
0.767
50.408
3.511
1.366
3.200
0.736
55.630
55.914
0.826
0.092
0.532
53.417
264.557
24.783
Standard
Deviation
0.015
0.155
34.445
0.067
0.473
0.783
0.906
17.299
0.441
0.904
0.002
50.989
5.765
1.998
2.102
0.500
6.730
4.935
0.290
0.270
0.487
28.951
398.861
12.684
Standard
Deviation
0.005
0.076
2.950
0.029
0.037
0.038
0.500
0.823
0.893
117.473
0,474
0.885
1.738
106.019
4.226
2.154
2.014
0.441
6.644
3.138
0.379
0.289
0.499
55.627
566.243
40.995
Minimum
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.0004
0,000
0.000
0.012
0.100
0.000
0.000
0.000
0,015
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
38.000
70.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
-106.000
-37.164
Minimum
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.001
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.001
0.150
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.300
0.000
0.000
0,000
0.000
23.000
51.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
-745.000
0.000
Maximum
0,067
0.499
100.000
0.420
1.000
7.000
24.000
300.000
1.000
7.000
0.048
650.000
50.000
15,000
20.000
1.000
98.000
90.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
700.000
14655.000
208.400
Maximum
0.035
0.389
10,000
0.632
0.503
0.480
1.000
15.000
14.400
2000.000
1.000 ‘
15.000
42.000
2000.000
56.000
19.000
19.000
1.000
85.000
61.000
1,000
1.000
1.000
1309.000
8734.700
1250.000
Notes: All financial variables are reported in thousands.Table 1B: Summary Statistics and Definitions of Variables .
For the Uninsured
AHEAD Variables
Buyer’s Belief (p) -- linear hazard model
Buyer’s Belief (p) -- constant hazard model
Buyer’s Estimate of Multiyear Survival
Number of Grandchildren
Number of Siblings
Number of Children
Married (dummy)
Age of Spouse (if married)
Age
White (dummy)
Black (dummy)
Female (dummy)
Annual Family Income
Wealth (W)
Loss of Income from Death of Insured (L)
HRS Variables
Buyer’s Belief (p) -- linear hazard model
Buyer’s Belief (p) -- constant hazard model
Buyer’s Estimate of Multiyear Survival
Actual Risk (Lower Bound)
Actual Risk (Upper Bound)
Number of Grandchildren
Number of Siblings
Number of Children
Married (dummy)
Age of Spouse (if married)
Age
White (dummy)
Black (dummy)
Female (dummy)
Annual Family Income
Wealth (W)
Loss of Income from Death of Insured (L)
~
2453
2453
2453
2414
2446
2453
2453
1049
2453
2453
2453
2453
2453
2453
2453
N
3036
3036
3036
2753
2753
2962
2962
2962
3036
1771
3036
3036
3036
3036
2918
2918
3036
Mean
0.014
0.149
41.598
5.464
1.989
2.555
0.436
74.489
77.229
0.904
0.077
0.706
23.034
191.492
3.590
Mean
0.003
0.051
6.253
0.017
0.039
4.059
1.470
3.333
0.657
56.728
55.942
0.752
0.103
0.655
41.211
246.135
13.812
Standard
Devlatlon
0.017
0.162
35.450
6.105
2.038
2.235
0.496
7.022
5.137
0.294
0.266
0.456
29.089
333.150
9.465
Standard
Deviation
0.006
0.087
3.136
0.035
0.048
4.814
2.356
2.208
0.475
7.075
3.144
0.432
0.304
0.475
46.548
597.102
22.172
Mlnlmum
0,000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
44.000
70.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
-96.100
-37.164
Mlnlmum
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.002
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
29.000
51.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
Maximum
0.067
0.499
100.000
50.000
15.000
20.000
1.000
93.000
90.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
500.000
5304.000
121.692
Maximum
0.035
0.389
10.000
0.482
0,503
56.000
14.000
19.000
1.000
82,000
61.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
0.000 ‘ 600.000
-463.000 8734.700
0.000 600.000
Notes: All financial variables are reported in thousands.Table 1C: Summay Statistics and Definitions of Variables
For Term Life Insurance Holders
AHEAD Variables
Buyer’s Belief (p) -- linear hazard model
Buyer’s Belief (p) -- constant hazard model
Buyer’s Estimate of Multiyear Survival
Unit Price of Term Insurance (q)
Number of Term Life Policies Held
Term Life Insurance Annual Premium
Term Life Insurance Award (Q)
Number of Grandchildren
Number of Siblings
Number of Children
Married (dummy)
Age of Spouse (if married)
Age
White (dummy)
Black (dummy)
Female (dummy)
Annual Family Income
Wealth (W)
Loss of Income from Death of Insured (L).
HRS Variables
Buyer’s Belief (p) -- linear hazard model
Buyer’s Belief (p) -- constant hazard model
Buyer’s Estimate of Multiyear Survival
Actual Risk (Lower Bound)
Actual Risk (Upper Bound)
Unit Price (q)
Number of Term Life Policies Held
Term Life Insurance Annual Premium
Term Life Insurance Award (Q)
Number of Grandchildren
Number of Siblings
Number of Children
Married (dummy)
Age of Spouse (if married)
Age
White (dummy)
Black (dummy)
Female (dummy)
Annual Family Income
Wealth (W)
Loss of Income from Death of Insured (L)
N
1868
1868
1868
786
1859
849
1669
1845
1865
1868
1868
956
1868
1868
1868
1868
1868
1868
1868
N
4367
4367
4367
4040
4040
2585
4326
2775
3920
4259
4259
4259
4367
3149
4367
4367
4367
4367
4367
4367
4367
Mean
0.013
0.140
40.787
0.072
1.383
0.350
7.529
5.808
2.141
2.670
0.522
73.145
76.092
0.882
0.106
0.554
22.482
162.219
5.366
Mean
0.002
0.039
6.550
0.013
0.028
0.022
1.324
0.533
61.801
3.242
1.358
3.156
0.755
54.802
55.800
0.856
0.089
0.454
60.016
249.625
32.049
Standard
Devlatlon
0.015
0.150
33.951
0.067
0.740
0.906
17.299
5.687
1.951
2.096
0.500
6.457
4.768
0.323
0.307
0.497
22.388
274.735
14.400
Standard
Deviation
0.004
0.070
2.853
0.027
0.031
0.039
0.697
0.893
117.473
3.961
2.080
1.955
0.430
6.506
3.149
0.351
0.284
0.498
60.246
525.762
49.087
Mlnlmum
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.0004
1.000
0.012
0.100
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
43.000
70.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
-106.000
-5.004
Minimum
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.001
0.000
1.000
0.001
0.150
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
23.000
51.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
-745.000
0.000
Maximum
0.067
0.499
100.000
0.420
7.000
24.000
300.000
48.000
11.000
16.000
1.000
92.000
89.000
1,000
1.000
1.000
212.000
5280.000
208.400
Maximum
0.035
0.389
10.000
0.632
0.470
0.480
15,000
14.400
2000.000
52.000
19.000
18.000
1.000
85.000
61.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1309.000
8734.700
1250.000
Notes: All financial variables are reported in thousands.Table 1D: Summary Statistics and Definitions of Variables
For Those With Multiple Term Life Insurance Policies
AHEAD Variables
Buyer’s Belief (p) -- linear hazard model
Buyer’s Belief (p) -- constant hazard model
Buyer’s Estimate of Multiyear Survival
Unit Price of Term Insurance (q)
Number of Term Life Policies Held
Term Life Insurance Annual Premium
Term Life Insurance Award (Q)
Number of Grandchildren
Number of Siblings
Number of Children
Married (dummy)
Age of Spouse (if married)
Age
White (dummy)
Black (dummy)
Female (dummy)
Annual Family Income
Wealth (W)
Loss of Income from Death of Insured (L)
HRS Variables
Buyer’s Belief (p) -- linear hazard model
Buyer’s Belief (p) -- constant hazard model
Buyer’s Estimate of Multiyear Survival
Actual Risk (Lower Bound)
Actual Risk (Upper Bound)
Unit Price (q)
- Number of Term Life Policies Held
Term Life Insurance Annual Premium
Term Life Insurance Award (Q)
Number of Grandchildren
Number of Siblings
Number of Children
Married (dummy)
Age of Spouse (if married)
Age
White (dummy)
Black (dummy)
Female (dummy)
Annual Family Income
Wealth (W)
Loss of Income from Death of Insured (L)
~
519
519
519
265
519
285
464
512
518
519
519
270
519
519
519
519
519
519
519
~
1033
1033
1033
964
964
783
1033
855
934
1005
1005
1005
1033
778
1033
1033
1033
1033
1033
1033
1033
Mean
0.013
0.144
39.837
0.079
2.371
0.398
9.145
6.168
2.234
2.658
0.541
72.698
76,075
0.881
0.110
0.505
21.909
151.474
4.874
Mean
0.002
0.039
6.437
0.013
0.029
0.016
2.312
0,696
107.673
2.991
1.306
3.136
0.785
53.943
55.669
0.882
0,073
0.336
65.758
296.351
36.196
Slandard
Deviation
0.015
0.151
34.604
0.075
0.777
0.795
20.451
5.889
2.014
2.163
0.499
6.521
4.614
0.324
0.313
0.500
20.130
222.937
12.086
Standard
Devlatlon
0.004
0.066
2.824
0.026
0.035
0.029
0.818
1.028
161.800
3.587
1.960
1.837
0.411
6.281
3.131
0.322
0.260
0.472
48.879
560.098
32.996
Minimum
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.0004
2.000
0.012
0.100
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
47.000
70.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
-106.000
-5.004
Minimum
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.003
0.000
2.000
0,001
0.150
0.000
Maximum
0.067
0.499
100.000
0.360
7.000
12.000
300.000
48.000
11.000
15.000
1.000
88.000
89.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
200.000
3090.000
180.000
Maximum
0.035
0.389
10.000
0.347
0.415
0.348
15.000
9.600
2000.000
24.000
0.000 ‘ ..---
0.000
0.000
30.000
51.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
-612.500
0.000
11.UUU
14.000
1.000
80.000
61.000
1,000
1.000
1.000
425.600
5740.000
410.000
Notes: All financial variables are reported in thousands.Table 2A: Equilibrium Demand and Unit Prices in HRS
Dependent Variable: Iog(Term Insurance Award)
Variable
Constant
Unit Price
Fitted Unit Price
Loss in Income from Death of Insurel
6.577 6.277
9.51 0.45
3,587
4.22
9.439
0.63
15.519 -14.720
-15.57 -13.15
-87,590
-8.30
-91.334
-5.79
0.010 0.006
9.96 3.79
0.002
1.15
0.002
1.10
Age
Wealth
-0.063 -0.097
-5.08 -0.19
0.033
1.76
-0.157
-0.29
-0.00004
-0.48
-0.0002
-2.24
Annual Family Income 0.004
2.87
0.0003
0.2
Number of Grandchildren
Number of Siblings
-0.024
-1.81
0.113
3.58
-0.018
-1.07
0.003
0.15
Number of Children 0.0004
0.02
-0.07
-2.12
Married 2.810
6.42
0.656
1.01
Age of Spouse -0.049
-6.45
-0.018
-1.74
R Squared
Number of Observations
0.324 0.358
937 898
0.214
937
0.261
898
Note: Results represent the coefficients and T statistics from a regression of the log
of the term award on price and applicant characteristics.
Data: Health and Retirement StudyTable 2B: Equilibrium Demand and Unit Prices in AHEAD
Dependent Variable: log(Term Insurance Award)
Variable m
Constant 4.243
7.17
Unit Price -4.320
-8.15
Fitted Unit”Price
.Loss in Income from Death of Insured 0.021
10.78
Age -0.035
-4.52
Wealth
Annual Family Income
Number of Grandchildren
Number of Siblings
Number of Children
Married
Age of Spouse
R Squared 0.277
Number of Observations 693
m
11.876
1.34
-3.646
-6.87
0.013
4.75
-0.253
-1.10
0.0001
1.36
0.005
2.12
-0.013
-1.85
-0.019
-1.1
0.012
0.59
2.731
5.05
-0.033
-4.50
0.343
682
m
2.633
2.20
-14.720
-2.75
0.017
6.01
-0.004
-0.22
0.227
612
Note: Results represent the coefficients and T statistics from a regression of the log
M
3.410
0.28
-5.456
-0.81
0.012
4.25
-0.029
-0.01
0.0001
1.21
0.004
1.07
-0.009
-0.49
-0.022
-1.18
-0.007
-0.17
3.199
4.20
-0.04
-3.71
0.308
601
of the term award on price and applicant characteristics.
Data: Asset and Health Dynamics Among the Oldest OldTable 3A: Equilibrium Demandand Reported Risk
Dependent variable:109Uerm Insurance Award)
Variable
Conshnl
One-Year Morrality Belief (I_inear Hazard)
,1<=Motility Risk<.2
.2c=Mo~lity Risk<.3
.3c=Mortality Riskc.4
,4<=Mortali~ Risk<.5
.5<-Mo*lity Risk<.6
,6<=Motility Risk<.7
.7<=Mortality Riskc.8
.8c.Motili~ Risk<,9
.9e=Mortality Risk<=l
Age
Age Squared
Loss in Income from Death of Insured
Wealth
Annual Family Inmme
Number of Grandchildren
Number of Siblings
Number of Children
Married
Age of Spouse
R Squared
Number of Observations
m
AHEAD
4.899
7.92
-4.117
-1.66
-0.048
-5.81
0.023
11,04
0.211
693
@
AHEAD
16,386
1,79
-2.558
-1.07
-0.367
-1,55
0.002
1.42
0.012
4.41
0.0Q02
1.46
0,006
2.75
-0.022
-2.88
4.019
-1.13
0,026
1,21
2.504
4.49
4.030
-3.90
0,296
682
AH?!
4.640
6,21
0.375
0.83
0.320
0,75
0.705
1,46
0,262
0s33
0.305
0.73
0.445
0.96
0.299
0.68
0,440
1.00
0.279
0.67
-0.049
-6.03
0,023
10.93
0.213
693
Note: Results represent tie mfficients and T statistics from a regression of the log
M
AHEAD
15.310
1.65
0,147
0.34
0.252
0.62
0.421
0.91
0,296
0,63
0,287
0.72
0.316
0.72
0.270
0.65
0.390
0.93
0,260
0,65
-0.346
-I .45
0.002
1.32
0.012
4,33
0,0002
1,52
0.006
2.67
-0.021
-2.71
-0.019
-1.05
0,022
1,00
2.550
4.48
-0.030
-3.90
0.299
682
w m
HRS HRS
6,608 7.la
8,46 0.47
-31.083 -22.524
-4.15 -3.05
-0.070 -0.144
-5.02 -0.27
0.001
0.23
0.011 0.006
10.28 4,00
4,00002
-0.16
0.004
2.87
-0.046
-3.20
-0.023
-1,26
0,011
0.38
3.199
6,75
-0.055
4.62
0.164 0.241
937 898
a
HRS
7,442
9s6
-0,183
-1,07
-0.202
-1.10
-0.081
-0.36
-0.414
-2.63
a,4w
-1.57
-0,274
-1,08
4.388
-1.66
4.999
-3.45
-0.864
-4.32
-0.081
-5.91
0.011
10,09
0,177
937
m
HRS
6,114
0,40
-0.073
-0.44
-0.134
-0.75
0.050
0,23
-0.283
-1.82
-0.070
-0.27
-0.127
-0.51
4.255
-1.13
-0.866
-3.17
-0.609
-3.06
-0,095
-0,18
0.0006
0,13
0.006
3.96
-0.00002
-0.21
-0.004
2.77
-0,047
-3.25
-0.026’
-1.39
0.016
0.53
3.226
6.82
-0.055
-6.69
0.252
898
of the term award on reported risk,
In HRS, multiyear survivals were reported as integers between Oand 10.
In AHEAD, multiyear survivals were reported as integers between Oand 1~.
The omined csI~ory is a reported momlity risk between Oand .1.
The method of estimating on-year hazards from tie reported rnorralityestimates
is described in Appendix 1.
Data: Health and Retirement SIUcfy,Asset and Health Dynamics Among the Oldest OldTable 3B: Equilibrium Demand and Empirical Risk in HRS
Dependent variable: log(Term Insurance Award)
Variable
Constant
Actual Risk (Upper Bound)
Actual Risk (Lower Bound)
Loss in Inmme from Death of Insured
Age
Age Squared
Wealth
Annual Family Income
Number of Grandchildren
Number of Siblings
Number of Children
Married
Age of Spouse
R Squared
Number of Observations
7.147 12.690
8.85 0.80
0.615 1.620
0.60 1.51
0.011 0.006
10.06 3.80
-0.082 -0.338
-5.68 -0.59
0.003
0.55
-0.00007
-0.70
0.004
3.14
-0.041
-2.66
-0.022
-1.10
-0.010
-0.33
3.260
6.54
-0.055
-6.30
0.146 0.229
857 822
m
HRS
0.396
0.80
0.396
0.26
0.011
10.05
-0.082
-5.59
0.145
857
w
HRS
9.680
0.61
0.727
0.48
0.006
3.81
-0.229
-0.40
0.002
0.36
-0.0001
-0.77
0.004
3.13
-0.040
-2.60
-0.023
-1.14
-0.010
-0.31
3.250
6,52
-0.056
-6.40
0,227
822
Note: Results represent the coefficients and T statistics from a regression of the log
of the term award on empirical risk.
Empirical riskis the likelihoodof death, estimated from a Iogit regression
of mortality Ondemographic characteristics. Empiriial risk exists for HRS only.
Attrited sample members are assumed to be dead in the upper bound of mortality
and alive in the lower bound.
Data: Health and Retirement studyTable 4A: Profits Implied by the Mortality Beliefs of the Insured in HRS
(Beliefs Constructed Using a Linear Hazard Model)
Population
Standard
Error Minimum Maximum Variable: N Mean
0.427
0.436
0.561
0.574
0,297
0.301
0.365
0.373
0.440
0.449
0.433
0.443
0.374
0.379
Entire Profit Under 00/~Discounting
Profit Under 10% Discounting
937
937
10.406
10.442
10.406
10.442
7.524
7.525
6.532
6.534
10.406
10.442
10.406
10.442
6.532
6.534
0.025
0.025
0,045
0.045
0.024
0.024
0.034
0.034
0.031
0.032
0.029
0.029
0.041
0.041
-1.382
-1.188
-0.964
-0.848
-1.382
-1.188
-0.964
-0,848
-1.382
-1.188
-1.382
-1.188
-0.398
-0.316
Males Profit Under OO/.Discounting
Profit Under 10% Discounting
451
451
Profit Under O% Discounting
Profit Under 100/~Discounting
Females 486
486
Nonwhiles Profit Under O% Discounting
Profit Under 10n/ODiscounting
262
262
Whites Profit Under 00/’ Discounting
Profit Under 10% Discounting
675
675
Nonblacks Profit Under O% Discounting
Profit Under 10% Discounting
760
760
Blacks Profit Under O% Discountin~ 177
Profti Under 10°/0 Discwnti;g 177
Notes: Profit under OO/.discounting is equal to (unit price - buyer beliefs) ”term award.
Profit under 10“/~ discounting is equal to (unit price - buyer beliefs/1.1 )“term award.
Data: HRS.
Table 4B: Profits Implied by the Mortality Beliefs of the Insured in HRS
(Beliefs Constructed Using a Constant Hazard Model)
Standard
Error Population Variable:
“ Entire Profit Under O% Discwnting
Profit Under 10% Discounting
~
937
937
451
451
486
486
262
262
675
675
760
760
, 177
177
Mean Minimum Maximum
-1.144
-0.992
0.122
0.110
-61.450
-55.379
-61.450
-55.379
-39.677
-36.002
-16.516
-14.986
-61.450
-55.379
-61.450
-55.379
-10.562
-9.556
7.258
7.284
6.455
6.596
7.258
7.284
6.095
6.137
7.258
7,284
7.258
7.284
6.095
6.137
Males Profit Under OO/.Discounting
Profit Under 10% Discounting
Females Profit Under O% Discounting
Profit Under 10% Discounting
Nonwhites Profit Under O% Discounting
Profit Under 10% Discoutiing
Whites Profit Under O% Discounting
Profit Under 100/’ Discounting
Nonblacks Profit Under 00/~Discounting
Profit Under 10O/.Dismounting
Blacks Profit Under O% Discounting
Profit Under 100/, Discounting
-1.798
-1.571
0.219
0.198
-0.502
-0.425
0.106
0.097
-0.897
-0.775
0.158
0.144
-1.194
-1.036
0.151
0.137
-1.227
-1.067
0.141
0.128
-0.434
-0.356
0.113
0.104
Notes: Profit under O% discounting is equal to (unit price - buyer belief s)”term award.
Profit under 10% discounting is equal to (unit price - buyer belief s/1.1 )“term award.
Data: HRSTable 4C: Profits Implied by the Mortality Beliefs of the Insured in AHEAD
(Beliefs Constructed Using a Linear Hazard Model)
Po~ulation
Standard
Error Minimum Variable: N Mean
0.267
0.276
0.389
0.400
0.164
0.170
0,309
0.314
0.260
0.269
0.259
0.268
0.320
0.325
Maximum
23,382
23.438
23.382
23.438
2.145
2.147
2.321
2.324
23.382
23.438
23.382
23.438
2.321
2.324
Entire Profit Under O%Discounting
Profit Under 100/~Discounting
693
693
0.036
0.036
0,076
0.076
0.013
0.013
0.029
0.029
0.043
0.043
0.042
0.042
0.032
0.032
-1.791
-1.583
-0.792
-0.656
-1.791
-1.583
-0.046
-0.037
-1.791
-1.583
-1.791
-1.583
-0.046
-0.037
Profit Under 00/’ Discounting
Profit Under 10% Discounting
Males 323
323
Females Profit Under O%Discounting
Profit Under 10% Discounting
370
370
Nonwhites Profit Under O% Discounting
Profit Under 10% Discounting
133
133
Whites Profit Under 0% Discounting
Profit Under 10% Discounting
560
560
Nonblacks Profit Under 0% Discounting
Profit Under 10% Discounting
571
571
Profit Under O% Discounting Blacks 122
Profit Under 10O/.Discounting 122
Notes: Profit under O% discounting is equal to (unit price - buyer belief s)’term award.
Profit under 100/~discounting is equal to (unit price - buyer beliefs/1.1 )*term award.
Data: AHEAD.
Table 4D: Profits Implied by the Mortality Beliefs of the Insured in AHEAD
(Beliefs Constructed Using a Constant Hazard Model)
Standard
Mean Error Minimum Population
Entire
Variable: N
693
693
323
323
370
370
133
133
560
560
571
571
122
122
Maximum
16.679
17.344
16.679
17.3U
1.957
1.975
1.900
1.941
16.679
17.344
16.679
17.344
1.900
1.941
Profit Under 0% Discounting
Profit Under 100/~Discounting
-0.668
-0.575
0.089
0.082
-26.494
-23.799
-26.494
-23.799
-23.003
-20.867
-4.033
-3.630
-26.494
-23.799
-26.494
-23.799
-4.033
-3.630
Males Profit Under O%Discounting
Profit Under 10% Discounting
-0.920
-0.790
0.159
0.146
Females Profit Under OO/.Discounting
Profit Under 10% Discounting
-0.455
-0.393
0.093
0.084
Nonwhites Profit Under O% Discounting
Profit Under 10O/.Discounting
-0.199
-0.148
0.065
0.060
Whites Profit Under 00/~Discounting
Profit Under 10% Discounting
0.107
0.098
-0.753
-0.652
Nonblacks
Blacks
Profit Under O% Discounting
Profit Under 10% Discounting
-0.743
-0.643
0.105
0,096
Profit Under O% Discounting
Profit Under 100/~Discounting
-0,204
-0.151
0.071
0.065
Notes: Profit under OOA, discounting is equal to (unit price - buyer beliefs) ’term award.
Profit under 10% discounting is eq~al to (unit price -‘buyer be~efs/1.1 )’term award.
Data: AHEADmq(Q) =:Q
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Figure 6B: Number of Term Policies Held by Risk in AHEADFigure 7: Conditioning By Uonometrician (Z), Suppliers (X), and Demanders (U)
Econometrician Supplier Demander Symmetric Aymmetric
U=l L,pl Q(pll),pll
X=l
Z=l U=o L,pl Q(plO),p10
U=l L,pO Q(pOl),pOl
X=o
U=o L,pO Q(pOO),pOO
U=l L,pl Q(pll),pll
X=l
Z=o U=o L,pl Q(plO),p10
U=l L,pO Q(pOl),pOl
X=o U=() L,pO Q(pOO),pOO
I